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INTRODUCTION 
Increasingly for many Americans, broadband Internet access is 
a fundamental aspect to remain interconnected and participate in 
everyday life.1 Many citizens have shifted their own communica-
tion and mediated environments and practices to an online world to 
engage socially, economically, politically, and culturally. There are 
                                                                                                                            
1 See, e.g., John Horrigan, Broadband Adoption and Use in America (FCC Omnibus 
Broadband Initiative, Working Paper Series, Paper No. 1, Feb. 2010), available at 
http://transition.fcc.gov/national-broadband-plan/broadband-adoption-in-america-
paper.pdf; Susannah Fox & Lee Rainie, The Web at 25 in the U.S., PEW RESEARCH 
CENTER (Feb. 27, 2014), http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/02/27/the-web-at-25-in-
the-u-s/; Janna Anderson & Lee Rainie, Digital Life in 2025, PEW RESEARCH CENTER 
(Mar. 11, 2014), http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/03/11/digital-life-in-2025/; THOM 
FILE & CAMILLE RYAN, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, COMPUTER AND INTERNET USE IN THE 
UNITED STATES: 2013, (2014), available at http://www.census.gov/content/dam/
Census/library/publications/2014/acs/acs-28.pdf. 
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also a growing number of individuals who depend heavily on high-
speed Internet service anywhere, anytime, whether through a tab-
let, desktop computer, SmartTV, video game console, or streaming 
media player via a local area network, Wi-Fi hotspot, 4G wireless, 
DSL, cable modem, or fiber-to-the-home. Arguably, one may sug-
gest that the mass media landscape and its related industry struc-
tures, revenue, and distribution models are in a period of tremen-
dous flux because of the Internet’s end-to-end design and ability to 
foster competition, innovation through digital distribution of over-
the-top content, and services that typically retain or improve the 
quality of existing offerings at a fraction of the price. 
While this outpouring of change allows for an expansion of 
voices in the marketplace, including user-generated content and 
social media, such a shift is predicated on viable high-speed Inter-
net access being not only available to as many citizens as possible, 
but also first and last mile providers who provide quality connec-
tions without egregious network management practices that may 
block or drop specific services or content or even discriminate by 
favoring specific popular Internet sites over others with exclusive 
rates for higher speeds of service. 
Although there have been very few blatant network manage-
ment abuses reported, imagine for an instant Comcast or any other 
cable operator’s dilemma with competing video content through 
edge providers like Netflix or Hulu that detract viewers from tradi-
tional television viewing and advertising. Comcast has relied heavi-
ly throughout the years upon revenue from subscribers paying for 
cable television services and increased its physical distribution plan 
with fiber to further increase channel capacity to compete with di-
rect broadcast satellite, offer more robust Internet connections, and 
enter the local telephone business. 
But today, that bundle of services is facing stiff competition as 
consumers cut the cord and drop their landline service and multi-
channel video program distributor (“MVPD”) subscriptions. To 
help abate some of these concerns and compete with emergent 
over-the-top video services and new facilities-based entrants like 
Verizon’s FIOS, Comcast rebranded its cable TV service and 
launched XFINITY TV to provide both on-demand set-top box 
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and online content.2 Arguably, it is not in Comcast’s best interests 
to cannibalize its current video subscription revenues and simply 
watch its broadband subscribers migrate to over-the-top services 
for competing video content. 
As this past year’s debate has highlighted, there is a fear that 
fixed and mobile broadband Internet access providers may begin to 
peel back on their practices of openness at any given time without 
strong network neutrality provisions such as those recently put into 
place and those overturned in the past. A provider like Comcast is 
both horizontally and vertically integrated in the types of services 
and content it owns3 and may in effect use the first- and last-mile 
broadband leverage to help retain and even grow revenue flows.4 
After all, in most markets, there are typically two facilities-based 
competitors for fixed broadband Internet access, especially when 
seeking a 25 Mbps connection.5 As a result, a broadband duopoly 
scenario leaves a tremendous amount of power and discretion with 
the two Internet access providers in how they manage their net-
work. Perhaps even more profound is the occurrence of a company 
like Verizon that provides its own MVPD service as well as fixed 
and mobile high-speed Internet. While there are four large wireless 
broadband providers in the country that provide cellphone service, 
there is only one facilities-based provider, Verizon, that provides 
consumers with the potential bundle of both fixed and wireless 
broadband Internet access and MVPD service. 
                                                                                                                            
2 Todd Spangler, Comcast Counts to ‘Xfinity’, MULTICHANNEL NEWS (Dec. 21, 2009), 
http://www.multichannel.com/news/cable-operators/comcast-counts-xfinity/329060. A 
couple of months after rebranding TV, Comcast decided to use the name for its entire 
product line and platforms. See Mike Farrell, Comcast Rebrand: to Xfinity and Beyond, 
MULTICHANNEL NEWS (Feb. 8, 2010), http://www.multichannel.com/news/marketing/
comcast-rebrand-xfinity-and-beyond/291590. 
3 Brad Bannon, The Big, Bad Comcast Merger, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 27, 
2014, http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/brad-bannon/2014/08/27/the-comcast-
time-warner-merger-is-bad-for-everybody. 
4 Grant Gross, Comcast deal gives it market power on Internet backbone, critic says, PC 
WORLD (May 8, 2014), http://www.pcworld.com/article/2153000/comcast-deal-gives-it-
market-power-on-internet-backbone-critic-says.html. 
5 Brian Fung, FCC Chairman: ‘A Duopoly’ Dominates Basic Internet Service in America, 
WASH. POST, Sept. 4, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/
2014/09/04/fcc-chairman-a-duopoly-dominates-basic-internet-service-in-america/. 
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To help clarify these issues, in 2010 the Federal Communica-
tions Commission established the “Open Internet Rules” for 
broadband providers, calling for three network-management prin-
ciples centered on antiblocking, non-discrimination, and transpar-
ency requirements.6 Recently, in Verizon v. FCC, the D.C. Circuit 
Court of Appeals vacated the antiblocking and non-discriminatory 
provisions but left the transparency requirements intact for both 
fixed and wireless broadband providers.7 Likewise, the FCC re-
cently issued its 2015 Open Internet order that reiterated and en-
hanced the previously upheld transparency rules.8 
Moving forward, transparency requirements are therefore a 
central focus within the FCC’s approach to foster an open Internet 
and appear integral to the future broadband ecosystem. Even 
though broadband providers publish and distribute terms of service 
conditions to obtain user consent and avoid legal liability, only re-
cently have they been required by law to disclose how they manage 
the network and report important consumer quality-of-service in-
formation like speed and latency. Through legal research and anal-
ysis, this Article reviews the shift toward transparency and disclo-
sure as part of the solution to the network neutrality debate by ask-
ing the following research question: How do the FCC’s suggested 
transparency requirements, as set forth thus far in the Open Inter-
net Rules, apply to broadband Internet access providers? 
Part I of this Article discusses the regulation and judicial review 
behind the network neutrality debate. Part II reviews the FCC’s 
transition to transparency as detailed in the Open Internet Rules, 
focusing specifically on what fixed and mobile broadband providers 
may disclose to comply with the provisions and avoid potential 
sanctions. To further help illustrate how the transparency rules ap-
ply, Part III examines Verizon’s terms of service conditions to 
measure to how its fixed and mobile broadband Internet access ser-
vices comply with the FCC’s suggested disclosure practices. Last-
ly, Part IV provides an appraisal of the FCC’s transparency ef-
                                                                                                                            
6 See Preserving the Open Internet, 25 FCC Rcd. 17,905, ¶ 1 (2010). 
7 See Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 659 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
8 Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, GN Docket No. 14–28, Report and 
Order on Remand, Declaratory Ruling and Order ¶ 24 (Mar. 12, 2015), available at 
http://www.fcc.gov/openinternet [hereinafter 2015 Open Internet Order]. 
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forts—which have thus far withstood legal challenge—as a solution 
in network neutrality policy and offers suggestions regarding fur-
ther disclosure of meaningful information to consumers. 
I. REGULATION & JUDICIAL REVIEW INVOLVING 
NETWORK NEUTRALITY 
Network neutrality is an ongoing debate concerning the degree 
to which Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”) may exercise control 
over their own network, including their ability to route traffic effi-
ciently and charge different prices for faster service.9 With its roots 
in broadband open-access policy10 and the Computer Inquiries,11 
the issue stemmed from fears a post-Brand X environment where 
ISPs who are deemed to provide “information services” are largely 
left unregulated even though their core product involves a “tele-
communications component,”12 one which would by past regulato-
ry standards seemingly invoke some type of common-carrier bur-
den that would otherwise ensure that providers would not discrim-
inate among similarly situated users or content. 
A primary reason that the debate exists is that Congress has 
largely left this question unanswered within the Communications 
Act of 1934,13 as amended by the Telecommunications Act of 
                                                                                                                            
9 There is a great deal of scholarship addressing network neutrality. See, e.g., Jan 
Krämer et al., Net Neutrality: A Progress Report, 37 TELECOMM. POL’Y 794–813 (2013); 
Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH 
TECH. L. 141–75 (2003); Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, 19 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 2–77 (2005); Tim Wu & Christopher Yoo, Keeping the Internet Neutral?: Tim Wu 
and Christopher Yoo Debate, 59 FED. COMM. L.J. 575–92 (2007); Rob Frieden, Network 
Neutrality or Bias-Handicapping the Odds for a Tiered and Branded Internet, 29 HASTINGS 
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 171 (2006). 
10 For legal analysis of the open access debate, see Justin Brown, Fostering the Public’s 
End-to-End: A Policy Initiative for Separating Broadband Transport from Content, 8 COMM. 
L. & POL’Y 146–99 (2003); Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, Open Access to Cable 
Modems, 22 WHITTIER L. REV. 3 (2000); Harold Feld, Whose Line is It Anyway—The First 
Amendment and Cable Open Access, 8 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 23 (2000); James B. Speta, 
Handicapping the Race for the Last Mile: A Critique of Open Access Rules for Broadband 
Platforms, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 40–91 (2000). 
11 For legal analysis on the Computer Inquiries, see Robert M. Frieden, The Third 
Computer Inquiry: A Deregulatory Dilemma, 38 FED. COMM. L.J. 383–410 (1987). 
12 See Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 984–
85 (2005). 
13 Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1996). 
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1996.14 Even though the Telecommunications Act of 1996 leveled 
the playing field between phone and cable operators offering one 
another’s services, it did little in answering how ISPs should be 
classified and regulated, especially in a broadband environment 
that features digital subscriber lines, cable modems, and more re-
cently, fiber to the curb or home as well as mobile, including 4G 
LTE services. Furthermore, as broadband speeds and utility rise, 
concerns mount over how so-called edge and over-the-top 
(“OTT”) providers like Netflix, Hulu, YouTube and Pandora may 
be treated.15 With the exception of YouTube via Google, these pro-
viders do not own the first and last mile access to the Internet, os-
tensibly relying upon broadband ISPs to carry their traffic to reach 
their customers.16 
A. The FCC’s Network Management Principles 
As a result of initial fears of what may happen in an unregulated 
information services environment, the FCC crafted an Internet 
Policy Statement in 2005 that called for “neutral” behavior among 
ISPs.17 Specifically, the FCC adopted four principles, asserting that 
consumers are entitled: (1) “to access the lawful Internet content 
of their choice”; (2) “to run applications and use services of their 
choice, subject to the needs of law enforcement”; (3) “to connect 
their choice of legal devices that do not harm the network”; and (4) 
“to competition among network providers, application and service 
providers, and content providers.”18  
The Commission justified these provisions as within its powers 
of ancillary jurisdiction under Title I of the Communications Act 
and necessary to help promote broadband deployment and ad-
vanced telecommunications capability as specified in Section 706.19 
                                                                                                                            
14 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996). 
15 Michael Sorrentino, Top Internet Companies Push for Net Neutrality Ahead of FCC 
Comment Deadline, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, July 14, 2014, http://www.nydailynews.com/
news/politics/internet-brands-push-net-neutrality-fcc-deadline-article-1.1866402. 
16 Nilay Patel, Over the Top: The New War For TV is Just Beginning, THE VERGE (Nov. 
12, 2012), http://www.theverge.com/2012/11/12/3633984/future-of-tv-over-the-top. 
17 See Policy Statement, Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet 
over Wireline Facilities, 20 FCC Rcd. 14,986, 14,986 (2005). 
18 Id. at 14,988. 
19 See id. at 14,987. 
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Moreover, the provisions help instill and encourage an open, vi-
brant, competitive, and interconnected Internet that is grounded in 
Section 230(b).20 The FCC made clear that these principles are 
“subject to reasonable network management” practices and did 
not constitute official rules.21 
B. Comcast v. FCC 
In 2007, the Associated Press alleged Comcast was blocking 
peer-to-peer (“P2P”) applications on its network.22 Specifically, 
Comcast was interfering with users trying to upload and share 
Gnutella and BitTorrent files.23 Free Press filed a complaint against 
Comcast24 and a petition with the FCC25 requesting that the 
Commission declare that such application degradation and block-
ing fall outside of acceptable network management practices as set 
forth in the Internet Policy Statement. 
Upon receiving public comment on the petition and conducting 
its own investigation, the FCC found that Comcast did degrade 
P2P applications and had in effect prevented consumers from ac-
cessing lawful applications of their choice, thus violating the Inter-
net Policy Statement.26 One primary reason the FCC found fault 
with Comcast’s approach was that it failed to fully disclose its net-
work management practices.27 Because Comcast had already 
agreed to stop its specific management methods relevant to P2P 
applications, the FCC issued neither a fine nor a cease and desist 
order. Rather, the FCC required Comcast to become more trans-
parent by clearly establishing and publicly disclosing its network 
management practices and developing a plan to incorporate non-
                                                                                                                            
20 See id. 
21 See id. at 14,988 n.15. 
22 Peter Svensson, Comcast Blocks Some Internet Traffic, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 19, 
2007, available at http://www.nbcnews.com/id/21376597/#.U3BRYPldWa8. 
23 Id. These programs are typically used to exchange music and video files, often to 
avoid paying for copyrighted works. At the time of the findings in 2007, it was estimated 
that P2P applications accounted for 50 to 90 percent of overall Internet traffic. Id. 
24 Formal Complaint of Free Press & Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corporation 
For Secretly Disregarding Peer-to-Peer Applications, 23 FCC Rcd. 13,028 (2008). 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
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discriminatory network methods within thirty days.28 After Com-
cast complied and filed its network management practices, the 
Commission took issue with how Comcast treats its own and com-
petitors’ Voice over Internet Protocol (“VoIP”) phone services, 
including why these voice services should not be treated as tele-
communications services within Title II of the Communications 
Act.29 
Even though Comcast abated the questionable network man-
agement practices involving P2P applications and argued that its 
VoIP services fall outside the scope of telecommunications ser-
vices, it nevertheless appealed the FCC’s decision to the D.C. Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals.30 Upon review, the court ruled the FCC 
failed to establish how its ancillary jurisdiction was connected to a 
clear statutory provision and vacated the FCC’s Comcast order.31 
By applying the American Library Association v. FCC32 test for 
ancillary jurisdiction, the court examined whether Title I applies to 
network practices among Cable ISPs as well as whether these regu-
lations are “reasonably ancillary to the Commission’s effective per-
formance of its statutorily mandated responsibilities.”33 While 
finding Title I general jurisdiction applied, the court nevertheless 
found the FCC’s Internet Policy Statement did not amount to 
“statutorily mandated responsibilities” set forth in the Communi-
cations Act.34 In fact, the court articulated that mere reliance on 
policy statements found in the Communications Act to justify regu-
lation would provide too much latitude beyond powers delegated 
by Congress.35 
Because the FCC failed to establish its authority, the court did 
not visit whether it acted appropriately in determining Comcast’s 
P2P network management practices had violated its Internet Policy 
                                                                                                                            
28 Id. 
29 See Matthew Lasar, FCC wants to know if Comcast is interfering with VoIP, 
ARSTECHNICA (Jan. 19, 2009, 11:25 PM), http://www.arstechnica.com/business/
2009/01/fcc-wants-to-know-if-comcast-is-interfering-with-voip/. 
30 Comcast v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
31 Id. at 661. 
32 406 F.3d 689 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
33 Comcast, 600 F.3d at 646–47. 
34 Id. at 652. 
35 See id. at 661. 
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Statement. Some scholars have suggested that, because the Com-
mission did not seek public comments, the Internet Policy State-
ment would be unenforceable under the Administrative Procedures 
Act.36 Nevertheless, the court suggested that Section 706 of the 
Communications Act may grant the FCC reasonable ancillary ju-
risdiction to cover cable Internet services network management 
practices, in effect leaving the door open for future regulatory at-
tempts.37 
C. The FCC’s Open Internet Order 
While written with the goal of remedying the ancillary jurisdic-
tion question at issue in Comcast, the FCC’s Open Internet Rules 
establish several network neutrality provisions concerning trans-
parency, no blocking, and no unreasonable discrimination practices 
for both fixed and wireless broadband Internet access providers:38 
Transparency: All broadband providers “shall publicly disclose 
accurate information regarding network management practices, 
performance and commercial terms of [their] broadband Internet 
access services sufficient for consumers to make informed choices 
regarding the use of such service and for content, application, ser-
vice and device providers to develop, market and maintain their 
Internet offerings.”39 
No Blocking: Fixed broadband providers “shall not block lawful 
content, applications, services or non-harmful devices, subject to 
reasonable network management.”40 Mobile broadband providers 
“shall not block consumers from accessing lawful websites . . . nor 
block applications that compete with the provider’s voice or video 
telephony services, subject to reasonable network management.”41 
No Unreasonable Discrimination: All broadband providers 
“shall not unreasonably discriminate in transmitting lawful net-
                                                                                                                            
36 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 500 et seq. (2000). 
37 See Comcast, 600 F.3d at 658–59. 
38 Preserving the Open Internet, 25 FCC Rcd. 17,905, 17,906 (2010). 
39 Id. at 17,992, ¶ 8.3. 
40 Id. at ¶ 8.5. 
41 Id. 
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work traffic over a consumer’s broadband Internet access ser-
vice.”42 
The FCC defines a network management practice as reasonable 
“if it is appropriate and tailored to achieving a legitimate network 
management purpose”43 factoring in both network technology and 
architecture. The Commission also claims that “transparency and 
end-user control are touchstones of reasonableness.”44 
The FCC believes it possesses proper regulatory and ancillary 
jurisdiction powers under the broad mandate of Section 706 be-
cause the Open Internet Rules promote the deployment of “ad-
vanced telecommunications capability,” including Internet access, 
and further promote local competition and infrastructure invest-
ment.45 Under this section, the FCC generates annual reports on 
the availability of advanced telecommunications capability and may 
take swift action if needed to accelerate its development.46 In addi-
tion, the Commission contends the rules may also be supported 
through ancillary jurisdiction under Title II,47 Title III,48 and Title 
VI,49 and that the transparency provision may be supported by the 
need to supply annual reports to Congress50 and “obtain ‘full and 
complete information’ from common carriers and their affili-
ates.”51 
Furthermore, the FCC refuted claims that the transparency, no 
blocking, and no unreasonable discrimination practices violated 
either the First or Fifth Amendment.52 The Commission claims 
broadband providers’ First Amendment speaker rights are not vio-
lated because the rules themselves do not target specific messages 
or viewpoints and are therefore content-neutral under intermediate 
                                                                                                                            
42 Id. at 17,992, 17,993, § 8.7. 
43 Id. at 17,993, § 8.11. 
44 Id. at 17,908, ¶ 6. 
45 Id. at 17,971, ¶ 122. 
46 Id. at 17,972, ¶ 123. 
47 Id. at 17,972–74, ¶¶ 125–26. 
48 Id. at 17,975, 17,978–80, ¶ 128, 133–35. 
49 Id. at 17,975–79, ¶¶ 129–32. 
50 Id. at 17,980–81, ¶ 136. 
51 Id. at 17,981, ¶ 137 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 218 (2012)).  
52 See id. at 17,982–86. 
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scrutiny.53 The Open Internet Rules simply address the transmis-
sion service provided by broadband Internet access providers and, 
as a result, these carriers should be viewed merely as conduits for 
speech.54 The Fifth Amendment is not at issue because the Open 
Internet Rules do not amount to a taking of property but simply 
require broadband Internet access providers to be transparent and 
refrain from blocking or unreasonable discrimination when the 
“voluntarily” carry traffic.55 
D. Verizon v. FCC 
The D.C. Circuit vacated and remanded the anti-
discrimination and anti-blocking rules but upheld the transparency 
requirements.56 The court found difficulty in the fact that the FCC 
had reversed its own course in favoring rules that called for com-
mon-carrier provisions because these were in opposition to the in-
formation services classification agreed upon by the Commission in 
previous rulemaking and subsequent litigation.57 According to the 
court, this existing regulatory action negated the possibility of 
common-carrier provisions like the anti-blocking and anti-
discrimination rules because the FCC failed to find broadband ser-
vice providers as telecommunication service providers.58 The 
Communications Act has not been amended to clearly define 
broadband providers and delegate a particular regulatory classifica-
tion. Accordingly, broadband providers remain information service 
providers, free from Title II’s common-carrier requirements and 
may even engage in blocking or discrimination. 
In Verizon, the court even addressed how broadband ISPs have 
to treat edge providers under the no-blocking and discrimination 
                                                                                                                            
53 Id. at 17,983–85, ¶¶ 145–46. The rules serve an important governmental interest 
unrelated to the suppression of free expression and do not burden more speech than 
necessary. The governmental interests include “preserving an open Internet to encourage 
competition and remove impediments to infrastructure investment while enabling 
consumer choice, end-user control, free expression and the freedom to innovate without 
permission . . . ensure the public’s access to a multiplicity of information sources and 
maximize the Internet’s potential to serve the public’s interest.” Id. at 17,984, ¶ 146. 
54 Id. at 17,982–84, ¶¶ 141, 145. 
55 Id. at 17,985, ¶ 149. 
56 Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 659 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
57 Id. at 624. 
58 Id. at 644–53. 
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provisions of the Open Internet Rules.59 Using the analogy of Mid-
west Video II, the court suggested that the rules force broadband 
providers to in effect be common carriers of content because they 
must “serve all edge providers without unreasonable discrimina-
tion” and “hold themselves out to serve the public indiscriminate-
ly.”60 With the local access channel regulations at issue in FCC v. 
Midwest Video II,61 third parties providing programming may have 
forced carriage of their content and displaced the cable operator’s 
editorial discretion and control.62 The Supreme Court found that 
these local access requirements made cable operators de facto 
common carriers.63 Likewise, according to the D.C. Circuit, prior 
to the Open Internet Rules, broadband providers were able to re-
fuse to carry edge provider content by blocking or discriminating if 
they had exercised such an option, but the anti-blocking and anti-
discriminatory provisions in effect take away these rights64 and 
compel carriage to all edge providers in all circumstances.65 
In upholding the transparency provisions, the court suggested 
that the disclosure rules do not amount to common carrier obliga-
tions.66 Even though Verizon contended that the disclosure rules 
should fail if the anti-discrimination and anti-blocking rules were 
vacated, the court agreed with the FCC that the rules function sep-
arately and would have been adopted on their own.67 Accordingly, 
this decision breathed life into the FCC’s efforts to provide con-
sumers with more information about their Internet experience. 
E. Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet NPRM 
To respond to the jurisdictional and common carriage ques-
tions raised in Verizon v. FCC, the Commission drafted new pro-
posed rules in May 2014 in its effort to further clarify and modify 
                                                                                                                            
59 Id. at 656. 
60 Id. (internal citation omitted). 
61 440 U.S. 689 (1979). 
62 See Verizon, 740 F.3d at 654–56. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 653. 
65 Id. at 653–54. 
66 Id. at 654. 
67 Id. at 659. 
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its network neutrality policy in the Open Internet Order.68 The 
Commission suggested that the Verizon decision did not dismiss 
the ability to regulate broadband Internet service under Section 
706.69 Though the rules were unofficial, for both fixed and mobile 
broadband the FCC proposed to enhance the transparency rules, 
retain the no-blocking provisions under a revised rationale, and 
change the non-discrimination measure to no commercially unrea-
sonable practices.70 
The FCC reverts back to the exact language for the different 
no-blocking provisions that apply to fixed and mobile broadband as 
set forth in its Open Internet Order. In keeping these no-blocking 
rules, the Commission clarified that broadband providers may ne-
gotiate “individualized, differentiated arrangements with similarly-
situated edge providers” as long as they are commercially reasona-
ble71 and “do not degrade lawful content or service to below a min-
imum level of access.”72 The Commission states that the no-
blocking rule establishes a minimum service as a threshold that all 
broadband providers must meet, and such a result will “ensure that 
all users have access to an Internet experience that is sufficiently 
robust, fast and effectively usable,”73 including all end users and 
edge providers, even those who don’t enter into separate negotiat-
ed agreements for faster service. 
In modifying the non-discriminatory rules to no commercially 
unreasonable practices, the FCC suggests broadband providers en-
gage in commercially reasonable activities and prohibit unreasona-
ble “practices that, based on the totality of the circumstances, 
threaten to harm Internet openness and all that it protects.”74 As 
long as the conduct is commercially reasonable, such a rule allows 
broadband providers to reach individual terms and agreements to 
carry traffic with different end users and edge providers without 
having these same conditions apply to all customers indiscriminate-
                                                                                                                            
68 Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 79 Fed. Reg. 37,448 (July 1, 2014) (to 
be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 8). 
69 Id. at 37,455, ¶ 55. 
70 See id. at 37,449, ¶ 10. 
71 Id. at 37,460, ¶ 89. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 37,461, ¶ 98. 
74 Id. at 37,464, ¶ 116. 
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ly.75 The Commission “tentatively conclude[s]” that this rule 
should be distinct from the no-blocking rule, thereby allowing sepa-
rate review of these standards if questionable blocking or commer-
cially unreasonable practices occur.76 The FCC also clarifies that 
reasonable network management shall not constitute a commercial-
ly unreasonable practice.77 
Collectively, the new proposed rules would allow broadband 
providers to establish what is commonly referred to as “paid priori-
tization” or “pay for priority” for edge providers who supply pop-
ular over-the-top content, including online video distributors like 
Netflix, Hulu, Amazon, and YouTube.78 With the exception of 
Google in some markets, nearly all edge providers and end users do 
not own the first- and last-mile fixed or mobile broadband network 
connection that supplies the public with Internet access. With the 
new FCC suggestions, in effect these edge providers as well as 
high-traffic social media sites like Facebook and Twitter may nego-
tiate individual arrangements to attain a guaranteed quality and 
higher speed of service with broadband Internet access providers as 
long as the arrangements don’t amount to blocking or result in an 
unreasonable commercial practice.79 Such paid-peering deals have 
already taken place prior to the proposed rules,80 suggesting this 
trend may result in “toll booths” for Internet content and poten-
tially erode the ability for smaller edge users, startups, or end users 
with compelling content or services to reach the public because 
they won’t be able to pay for faster, higher-quality Internet ac-
                                                                                                                            
75 Id. at 37,464, ¶ 116. 
76 See id. ¶ 117. 
77 See id.  
78 Brooks Boliek & Jessica Meyers, FCC Vote: Net Neutrality with a ‘Fast Lane’, 
POLITICO (May 15, 2014), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/05/fcc-approve-net-
neutrality-proposal-open-internet-106720.html. 
79 See Edward Wyatt, F.C.C., in a Shift, Backs Fast Lanes for Web Traffic, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 23, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/24/technology/fcc-new-net-neut
rality-rules.html?_r=0; Edward Wyatt, F.C.C. Backs Opening Net Neutrality Rules for 
Debate, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/16/technology/
fcc-road-map-to-net-neutrality.html. 
80 Sam Gustin, Netflix Pays Verizon in Streaming Deal, Following Comcast Pact, TIME 
(Apr. 28, 2014), http://time.com/80192/netflix-verizon-paid-peering-agreement/. 
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cess.81 Instead, smaller edge providers and most end users will have 
to rely upon the notion under the no-blocking rules that there will 
be a minimum threshold of service and speed quality for all broad-
band Internet access providers. In contrast, some commentators 
believe the paid prioritization trend is an inevitable part of the 
growth and commercialization of the Internet. 
The FCC also suggests strengthening the existing transparency 
requirements that are in effect for broadband providers. The 
Commission believes “access to accurate information about broad-
band provider practices encourages the competition, innovation 
and high-quality services that drive consumer demand and broad-
band investment and deployment.”82 Although it previously stated 
that a single disclosure may suffice, the FCC tentatively concludes 
that three tailored disclosures would be best to meet the different 
interests and needs of end users, edge providers, and the broader 
Internet community.83 For instance, end users require accurate in-
formation to make educated purchasing and broadband usage deci-
sions, whereas edge providers may benefit from more technical da-
ta and information that may spur the creation of broadband apps 
and services. Meanwhile, the Internet community at large, includ-
ing the FCC, is concerned with monitoring reasonable network 
practices that may impact the openness of the Internet.84 
Beyond tailoring the disclosures to three different audiences, 
the FCC suggests requiring broadband Internet access providers to 
make more information publicly available concerning network prac-
tices. First, the FCC proposes the transparency rules should also 
require broadband Internet access providers to disclose “meaning-
ful information regarding source timing speed packet loss and dura-
                                                                                                                            
81 See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig & Robert W. McChesney, Opinion, No Tolls on The 
Internet, WASH. POST, June 8, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2006/06/07/AR2006060702108.html; Nikke Finke, Comcast Accused of ‘Putting 
up Toll Booth’ and ‘Take it or Leave it Demands’ for Online Movie Transmission by Rivals, 
DEADLINE (Nov. 29, 2010), http://deadline.com/2010/11/comcast-accused-of-putting-
up-a-toll-booth-for-online-movie-transmission-by-rivals-87142/. 
82 Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 79 Fed. Reg. 37,448-01, ¶ 66 (July 1, 
2014) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 8). 
83 Id. at 37,457, ¶ 68. 
84 Id. at 37,456–57, ¶ 66. 
2015] NEUTRALITY 2.0 655 
 
tion of congestion.”85 In addition, disclosure should happen in a 
timely fashion to parties whenever broadband providers “make 
changes to network practices as well as blocking, throttling and pay 
for priority arrangements or parameters of default or ‘best effort’ 
service as distinct from any priority service.”86 
The FCC also requested comments on a range of issues related 
to its proposed refinements to the network neutrality rules, includ-
ing proper regulatory authority under Section 706 or Title II, Title 
III (mobile), the new rule, definition and impact of “no commer-
cially unreasonable practices,” how edge provider carriage of traf-
fic should be defined and whether it should be classified as a sepa-
rate service,87 and further details concerning the enhancement of 
the transparency provisions. In addition, the proposed rules added 
definitions involving what constitutes block,88 edge provider,89 and 
end users90 but left the terms of what constitutes fixed, mobile, and 
broadband Internet access services as well as reasonable network 
management unchanged. 
F. 2015 Open Internet Order 
To help validate its justification and approach to an open Inter-
net and instill network neutrality provisions,91 the FCC reclassified 
broadband Internet access service92 as a telecommunications ser-
                                                                                                                            
85 Id.; see also id. at 37,479–83 (discussing the proposed rules). 
86 Id. at 37,458, ¶ 78. 
87 Id. at 37,455, ¶ 55. 
88 Id. at 37,480, § 8.11(a) (“The failure of a broadband Internet access service to 
provide an edge provider with a minimum level of access that is sufficiently robust, fast, 
and dynamic for effective use by end users and edge providers.”). 
89 Id. § 8.11(c) (“Any individual or entity that provides any content, application, or 
service over the Internet, and any individual or entity that provides a device for accessing 
any content, application, or service over the Internet.”). 
90 Id. at 37,480, § 8.11(d) (defining “end users” as “[a]ny individual or entity that uses 
a broadband Internet access service”). 
91 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 8, ¶¶ 1–4. 
92 Broadband Internet access service is 
a mass-market retail service by wire or radio that provides the 
capability to transmit data to and receive data from all of substantially 
all Internet endpoints, including any capabilities that are incidental to 
and enable the operation of the communications service, but 
excluding dial-up Internet access service. This term also encompasses 
any service that the Commission finds to be providing a functional 
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vice, applying common carrier, Title II classification to both fixed 
and wireless providers.93 This particular determination represents 
a significant shift from previous regulatory classifications that 
treated broadband Internet access service as an “information ser-
vice.”94 Even though the FCC adopted the telecommunications 
service classification, its approach is nevertheless “common carrier 
light” as evidenced by its exercise of forbearance authority for 
twenty seven different Title II provisions,95 including no tariffing 
(rate regulation).96 The Commission also utilized advanced tele-
communications capability under Section 706 to help bolster its 
common carrier-light approach97 as well as Title III regulatory ju-
risdiction to buttress its telecommunications service classification 
of wireless Internet access service.98  
Within these foundations, the FCC issued several main net-
work neutrality provisions, retaining the no-blocking provisions on 
“lawful content applications, services or non-harm devices,”99 and 
prohibiting the practice of “throttling,”100 subject to “reasonable 
network management.”101 To abate concerns raised by edge pro-
viders that some traffic may receive special high-speed lanes,102 the 
                                                                                                                            
equivalent of the service described in the previous sentence, or that is 
used to evade the protections set forth in this part.  
Id. ¶ 25. 
93 Id. ¶¶ 27, 283–84. 
94 Id. ¶ 43 (“The facts in the market today are very different from the facts that 
supported the Commission’s 2002 decision to treat cable broadband service as an 
information service and its subsequent application to fixed and mobile broadband 
services.”). 
95 Id. ¶¶ 5, 493. 
96 Id. ¶¶ 41–42, 497–505. 
97 Id. ¶¶ 275–82. 
98 Id. ¶¶ 285–88. 
99 Id. ¶ 15. 
100 Id. ¶ 16 (Throttling is defined as “impair of degrade lawful Internet traffic on the 
basis of Internet content, application, or service, or use of a non-harmful device.”). 
101 Id. ¶¶ 32,215 (“A network management practice is a practice that has a primarily 
technical network management justification, but does not include other business 
practices. A network management practice is reasonable if it is primarily used for and 
tailored to achieving a legitimate network management purpose, taking into account the 
particular network architecture and technology of the broadband Internet access 
service.”). 
102 Id. ¶¶ 20, 80. 
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FCC also barred the practice of “paid prioritization.”103 Instead of 
restricting commercially unreasonable practices, the FCC created a 
new rule that prohibits ISPs from unreasonably interfering with or 
disadvantaging consumers’ ability “to reach Internet content, ser-
vices and applications of their choosing”104 as well as edge provid-
ers’ access to Internet consumers.105 These provisions will be ap-
plied to make determinations on whether to allow so-called spon-
sored data plans by ISPs106 and data caps that meter and tier the 
amount of downloading.107 
In addition to outlawing blocking, throttling, and paid prioriti-
zation, the FCC also further enhanced its existing transparency 
provisions contained in the Open Internet Rules for end users and 
edge providers.108 Broadband providers are now required to dis-
close promotional rates, all fees and/or surcharges and include spe-
cific information on all data caps or allowances in their terms of 
service.109 In addition, to help end users be better informed, broad-
band providers must include packet loss as a measure of network 
performance.110 Customers must also be notified when a network 
practice may be likely to significantly impact their use of broadband 
Internet access.111 With respect to the format and nature of re-
quired disclosure to consumers, the FCC declined to require sepa-
rate disclosures for end users and edge providers112 but established 
a “safe harbor” process for broadband providers to help aid in the 
effective presentation of required information.113 
                                                                                                                            
103 Id. ¶ 18 (“‘Paid prioritization’ refers to the management of a broadband provider’s 
network to directly or indirectly favor some traffic over other traffic, including through 
the use of techniques such as traffic shaping, prioritization, resource reservation, or other 
forms of preferential traffic management, either (a) in exchange for consideration 
(monetary or otherwise) from a third party or (b) to benefit an affiliated entity.”). 
104 Id. ¶ 135. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. ¶¶ 151, 152. 
107 Id. ¶ 153. 
108 Id. ¶ 24. 
109 Id. ¶¶ 24, 161. 
110 Id. ¶¶ 24, 166. 
111 Id. ¶¶ 24, 169. 
112 Id. ¶ 177. 
113 Id. ¶¶ 24, 179–81. 
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II. TRANSPARENCY AS NETWORK NEUTRALITY POLICY 
Systems of law, policy, and government are based on the avail-
ability of information.114 One may simply not understand, debate, 
maintain, or enforce the law—regardless of whether it is statutory, 
common, constitutional, or executive—if the public does not have 
the ability to access it, know what conduct or actions are accepta-
ble, or know what sanctions may be rendered. But beyond under-
standing the law and its sanctions, transparency is typically concep-
tualized as information that the public, including the press and its 
tools under the fourth estate, may access to effectively monitor 
government in a democracy and hold it accountable.115 Within 
states and federally, “sunshine” and freedom-of-information laws 
and processes exist to make as many meetings and information 
open as possible.116 Regulatory agencies like the FCC have to fol-
low these provisions and also publicly announce steps involved 
within the rulemaking process within the Administrative Procedure 
Act, including initial and reply comments to foster disclosure and 
fairness when enacting official rule changes.117 The White House 
and President Obama’s Memorandum on Transparency and Open 
Government, part of its Open Government Directive, suggests that 
“openness will strengthen our democracy and promote efficiency 
and effectiveness in Government,”118 asserting that transparency 
can also lead to greater civic participation and better policy deci-
sions.119 
But an often forgotten area of transparency lies in instances 
where the government, acting on behalf of the public, requires pri-
                                                                                                                            
114 See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Open Government, 14 GOV’T INFO. Q. 397, 397–406 (1997). 
115 See, e.g., Frederick Shauer, Transparency in Three Dimensions, U. ILL. L. REV. 1339, 
1343–50 (2011). 
116 Sandara F. Chance, Access to Public Documents and Meetings, in COMMUNICATIONS 
AND THE LAW 373–74 (W. Wat Hopkins ed., 2012). 
117 Adam Candeub, Transparency in the Administrative State, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 385, 396 
(2013). 
118 Transparency and Open Government, Memorandum for the Heads of Executive 
Departments and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,685–86 (Jan. 21, 2009), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2009-01-26/pdf/E9-1777.pdf. 
119 Patrice McDermott, Building Open Government, 27 GOV’T INFO. Q. 401, 401–13 
(2010). 
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vate actors to disclose information.120 Within the regulation of pri-
vate actors, transparency plays an important role in incentivizing 
good behavior, promoting informed decision-making from con-
sumers, and preventing corruption. For industry stakeholders, this 
method of regulation is much less cumbersome than laws mandat-
ing specific conduct and behavior and may be used to help promote 
market safeguards. Within various sectors of the economy, disclo-
sure of information by private companies to the public is nothing 
new and provides an important vehicle for accountability. Regula-
tory transparency and disclosure laws exist, for instance, for public-
ly traded companies; financial, banking, trading, and lending insti-
tutions; cyber breaches; higher education institutions receiving 
public grants; and food and pharmaceutical industries.121 Because 
of the increased importance of fixed and wireless broadband con-
nectivity, it is within this vein that the FCC’s network neutrality 
disclosure rules were created, in effect, to not only understand the 
network management practices of broadband Internet access pro-
viders but also foster further growth in the deployment of advanced 
telecommunications capability. 
Several scholars have addressed the role of transparency as an 
important policy remedy to address network neutrality. Before the 
recent policy developments in the US, Europe approached network 
neutrality primarily from a transparency perspective under the new 
EU Regulatory Framework for Telecommunications, whereby reg-
ulators rely upon making consumers more aware of the network 
management practices of their network operators and place empha-
sis on quality of service measures.122 Using experimental economic 
research, Sluijs, Schuett, and Henze suggest information disclosed 
regarding broadband quality leads to a higher total surplus and con-
sumer surplus.123 
                                                                                                                            
120 Such a process has been referred to as “audited self-regulation.” See Douglas C. 
Mitchell, Federal Agency Use of Audited Self-Regulation as a Regulatory Technique, 47 
ADMIN. L. REV. 171, 176 (1995). 
121 See generally David Weil et al., The Effectiveness of Regulatory Disclosure Policies, 25 J. 
OF POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 155 (2006). 
122 See Jasper P. Sluijs et al., Transparency Regulation in Broadband Markets: Lessons from 
Experimental Research, 35 TELECOMM. POL’Y 592, 592–94 (2011). 
123 Id. at 600. 
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In arguing that the FCC has authority to enforce disclosure re-
quirements, Amanda Leese suggests the network neutrality disclo-
sure rules impact market competition and user behavior broadly, 
and are distinct from the content-based network management prac-
tices of non-discrimination and no-blocking yet nevertheless re-
main vital for such provisions to function cohesively.124 Larry 
Downes suggests the transparency rule’s standard rooted in infor-
mation “sufficient” for consumers to make “informed choices” 
may be too broad and result in information overload for most con-
sumers. As the FCC suggests, to help abate these concerns, net-
work neutrality disclosure policy may have to rely upon third par-
ties to help monitor and evaluate broadband network management 
practices.125 
In a similar vein, Elizabeth Austin Bonner suggests that the 
rules may provide consumers too much information without the 
literacy to understand such technical information.126 As an alterna-
tive, the FCC may pursue simplified disclosures to consumers and 
a more intricate and technically detailed set of network manage-
ment practices to over-the-top content and service providers.127 
Nevertheless, Bonner praises the disclosure efforts for their ability 
to foster greater broadband services competition and performance, 
increase citizen participation in policymaking, and shift costs away 
from regulators to industry while requiring less precision than oth-
er measures.128 
Adam Candeub and John McCartney are critical of the network 
neutrality disclosure provisions’ assumptions regarding consum-
ers.129 Because most consumers do not have a competitive choice 
among broadband providers, any information disclosed will not be 
                                                                                                                            
124 Amanda Leese, Net Transparency: Post-Comcast FCC Authority to Enforce Disclosure 
Requirements Critical to ‘Preserving the Internet’, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 81, 98 
(2013). 
125 See Larry Downes, Unscrambling the FCC’s Net Neutrality Order: Preserving the Open 
Internet But Which One?, 20 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 83, 90 (2011). 
126 See Elizabeth Austin Bonner, Network Neutrality Disclosures: More and Less 
Information, 8 I/S: J. OF L. & POL’Y FOR THE INFO. SOC’Y 173, 179 (2012). 
127 See id. at 197–202. 
128 Id. at 182. 
129 See Adam Candeub & Daniel John McCartney, Network Transparency: Seeing the 
Neutral Network, 8 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 228, 229–30 (2010). 
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very useful to foster greater market competition or performance.130 
In addition, most typical consumers will lack the technical acumen 
to understand traffic management practices.131 Furthermore, there 
are concerns over what content should be disclosed to help con-
sumers. “Effective disclosure must actually aid consumers (or 
market intermediaries) in assessing the value of the product,”132 
but finding the quality or value of Internet access presents several 
questions regarding adjacent networks, traffic policies of their 
peers, and how different types of traffic are handled by network 
management practices. Alternatively, Candeub and McCartney 
propose that network transparency should focus on internal traffic 
management practices to assess quality of service as well external 
interconnection relationships with ISPs.133 Furthermore, they rec-
ommend that disclosures be written to an “Internet Vanguard” 
audience that possesses the technical competency to understand 
network management practices.134 
There are also some policy advocates who are wary of network 
neutrality rules in general because of the costs they extract to 
broadband providers, including the transparency provisions. Con-
gresswoman Marsha Blackburn (R–TN) and FCC Commissioner 
Michael O’Rielly believe a thorough cost-benefit analysis of the 
transparency requirements is necessary to help measure consumer 
benefit, quantify costs, and abate concerns over regulatory over-
reach.135 
One central purpose behind the Open Internet Rules is to pro-
mote competition “throughout the Internet ecosystem.”136 The 
Commission suggests five reasons why disclosure of network man-
agement practices supports competition “as well as innovation, 
                                                                                                                            
130 See id. at 229. 
131 See id. at 234. 
132 See id. 
133 See id. at 241. 
134 See id. 
135 See Marsha Blackburn & Michael O’Rielly, A Closer Look at Net Neutrality: The 
FCC’s Net-Neutrality Rules Need a Thorough Cost-Benefit Analysis, NAT’L REV. ONLINE 
(July 10, 2014), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/382367/closer-look-net-neutral
ity-marsha-blackburn-michael-orielly. 
136 Preserving the Open Internet, 25 FCC Rcd. 17,905, 17,951 n.252 (2010). 
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investment, end-user choice and broadband adoption.”137 First, 
consumers are able to “make informed choices regarding the pur-
chase and use of broadband service.”138 Second, disclosure will 
build more confidence among broadband users and should lead to 
greater broadband adoption and investment.139 Third, the transpar-
ency rules provide startups and edge providers information that 
contributes to “innovation, investment and competition.”140 
Fourth, disclosure helps put pressure on broadband providers to 
abide by their disclosed practices while allowing the Internet com-
munity to monitor their conduct.141 Lastly, disclosure provides the 
necessary tools and information to the FCC to review, report, and 
enforce the transparency rules.142 
To some extent, disclosure practices are not entirely new to the 
FCC and the telecommunications industry. The FCC, for instance, 
has subjected common carriers to extensive filing requirements to 
disclose information143 and requires MVPDs, Internet access pro-
viders, and wireless carriers to report annual subscription and rev-
enue data. Broadcast television licensees are also required to dis-
close on a quarterly basis how they fulfill their requirements to air 
programming designed to meet children’s “educational and infor-
mational needs.”144 As a condition of their license, all broadcast 
stations are also required to maintain and make available a public 
inspection file upon request that serves to disclose to the public 
how they fulfill their public interest obligations.145 Likewise, as a 
result of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and the v-chip, the 
                                                                                                                            
137 Id. at 17,937–38, ¶ 55. 
138 Id. at 17,936, ¶ 53. 
139 See id. 
140 Id. 
141 See id. at 17,937. 
142 See id. 
143 See FCC, COMMON CARRIER FILING REQUIREMENTS – INFORMATION FOR FIRMS 
PROVIDING TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES (July 28, 2010), http://www.fcc.gov/
guides/common-carrier-filing-requirements-information-firms-providing-telecommunica
tions-services. 
144 FCC, CHILDREN’S EDUCATIONAL TELEVISION (Feb. 20, 2014), http://transit
ion.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/childtv.pdf. 
145 See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3526 (2013). 
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broadcast industry discloses its own television ratings system to 
consumers.146 
Cass Sunstein argues that so-called “information disclosure” 
to consumers is a more efficient and less expensive response to ad-
dress market failure than command-and-control regulation that dic-
tates specific conduct by firms.147 In addition, increasing infor-
mation to consumers—as opposed to direct forms of behavioral 
regulation—tends to minimize any First Amendment concerns that 
may be raised by telecommunications firms148 and provides greater 
regulatory flexibility.149 Furthermore, as a form of regulation, in-
formation disclosure helps foster deliberative democracy, specifi-
cally the ability for citizens to serve as watchdog to monitor private 
as well as public action and potentially call for change.150 As 
Sunstein suggests, “information disclosure works best when mar-
ket pressures, or political pressures, are likely to result in signifi-
cant costs for those whose performance is poor.”151 
Gerald Faulhaber contends transparency is important in the 
broadband context so consumers may understand their relationship 
with ISPs.152 Even without any network neutrality provisions, 
broadband ISPs should publicly disclose their offerings and be 
transparent with consumers because “markets can only work well 
if both producers and consumers are well-informed about the terms 
and conditions of transactions,”153 or they run the risk of market 
failure under information asymmetry. Faulhaber suggests four 
principles of transparency that may be used for policy analysis: 
                                                                                                                            
146 See FCC, THE PUBLIC AND BROADCASTING: HOW TO GET THE MOST SERVICE FROM 
YOUR LOCAL STATION (July 2008), https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-
08-940A2.pdf. 
147 Cass R. Sunstein, Television and the Public Interest, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 499, 534 
(2000). 
148 Id. at 533. 
149 Id. at 534. 
150 Id. at 534–35. 
151 Id. at 537. 
152 See Gerald R. Faulhaber, Transparency and Broadband Internet Service Providers, 4 
INT’L J. COMM. 738, 738–39 (2010). 
153 Id. 
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 “Disclose all information (and only such 
information) that a reasonable customer needs 
to make an informed purchase decision”154 
 “[E]asy access to the disclosed information”155 
 “Clarity and simplicity of disclosed 
information”156 
 “Verifiability of disclosed information”157 
An additional element of enforcement may be added to the 
above aspects of disclosure.158 The implementation of these princi-
ples is difficult in the broadband ISP industry where there are many 
variables that affect measures like speed, visibility, and ease of ac-
cess to terms of service agreements. This stems in part from the 
challenge of keeping network management practices simple, broad-
band ISPs’ business relationships with other ISPs, application and 
network providers and security concerns over malware.159 
Tracing the rise of disclosure rules within the network neutrali-
ty debate, Carp, Kulkarni, and Schmidt are skeptical of transparen-
cy efforts as a tool for public policy.160 They suggest transparency 
and disclosure are frequently used interchangeably by the FCC in 
its Open Internet Rules, whereby “disclosure is a tool to produce 
transparency, transparency simply requires disclosure. That pair-
ing is simplistic and inadequate. The disclosure of information does 
not ensure that the provision of broadband services is transpar-
ent.”161 
In fact, they warn against the disturbing trend of 
“nondisclosing disclosures” whereby terms or notices appear to be 
perfectly legal but are manipulated to obscure meaning.162 To guard 
                                                                                                                            
154 Id. at 742. 
155 Id. at 743. 
156 Id. at 744. 
157 Id. at 745. 
158 Id. at 747 n.10. 
159 Id. at 750–53. 
160 See Jeremy Carp et al., Transparency, Consumers, and the Pursuit of an Open Internet: 
A Critical Appraisal, in REGULATING THE WEB: NETWORK NEUTRALITY AND THE FATE OF 
THE OPEN INTERNET 49, 64 (Zack Stiegler ed., 2012). 
161 Id. 
162 Id. 
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against these outcomes, they suggest the Commission closely mon-
itor ISPs’ terms of service agreements.163 
In addition, Fung, Graham, and Weil’s model for transparency 
is suggested because it focuses on an “action cycle” between the 
disclosures (firms) and users as primary actors.164 Under this mod-
el, the mere pressure of disclosing information as well as users 
monitoring and exercising consumer choices likely enhances dis-
closing firms’ practices.165 Despite these incentives, enforcement is 
nevertheless an important part of transparency policy.166 
Today, disclosure is common practice through terms of service 
agreements when a subscriber signs up for telephone, cable, or 
wireless services.167 These terms of service or terms of use agree-
ments are by their very nature an attempted exercise in transparen-
cy by private companies who are providing contractual language 
that details their conduct, and through the consent process when 
someone agrees to the terms, they typically alleviate themselves 
from any specific liability or regulatory enforcement. But what is 
new is the nature by which terms of service agreements play an in-
creasingly important role in just about every facet of online life and, 
in the case of broadband Internet access service, may now fall in 
the hands of regulatory agencies like the FCC to monitor. Fur-
thermore, transparency takes on an additional layer when a regula-
tory agency like the FCC requests a specific range of information 
be disclosed to consumers and will fine providers who fail to com-
ply with the rules. 
A. Transparency Provisions of the Open Internet Rules 
Transparency rules are the only safeguards that have thus sur-
vived judicial review far by which the public and the FCC may en-
sure that broadband Internet access providers are adequately abid-
ing by their self-disclosed network management practices. While 
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the 2015 Open Internet Order enhanced the transparency require-
ments,168 the 2010 Open Internet Rules remain in full force with 
only slight modifications.169 For both fixed and mobile broadband 
providers, complying with the transparency rules “does not require 
public disclosure of competitively sensitive information or infor-
mation that would compromise network security or undermine the 
efficacy of reasonable network management practices.”170 Outside 
of these exceptions, the rules themselves provide a wide degree of 
latitude concerning the extent of information broadband providers 
have to disclose through their terms of service agreements and oth-
er policies. 
Through the Office of General Counsel (“OGC”) Transparen-
cy Compliance Public Notice, the FCC detailed five areas related 
to meeting the transparency rules as set forth in the 2010 Open In-
ternet Rules: (1) point-of-sale disclosures; (2) service descriptions; 
(3) security; (4) the tailoring of disclosures to content, applications, 
service, and device providers; and (5) extent of required disclo-
sures.171 Each of these areas is detailed below.  
1. Point-of-Sale Disclosures 
The FCC’s Enforcement Bureau and OGC issued basic sugges-
tions on how consumers must be afforded the opportunity to see 
terms of service agreements at the “point-of-sale” that include 
network management practices, performance characteristics, and 
commercial terms.172 To meet this portion of the disclosure rules, 
broadband providers must at the very least either prominently dis-
play or provide links to disclosures on a website easily accessible to 
                                                                                                                            
168 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 8, ¶ 24. 
169 Id. ¶ 161 (“All of the pieces of information described in paragraphs 56 and 98 of the 
Open Internet Order have been required as part of current transparency rule, and we will 
continue to require the information as part of our enhanced rule. The only exception is 
the requirement to disclose ‘typical frequency of congestion’ which we no longer require 
since it is superseded by more precise disclosures already required by the rule such as 
actual performance. Second, the requirement that all disclosures made by a broadband 
provider be accurate includes the need to maintain the accuracy of these disclosures.”). 
170 Preserving the Open Internet, 25 FCC Rcd. 17,905, 17,937–38 (2010). 
171 See FCC Enforcement Bureau and Office of General Counsel Issue Advisory 
Guidance for Compliance with the Open Internet Transparency Rule, 26 FCC Rcd. 9411 
(2011). 
172 Id. at 9414. 
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members of the public, including both new and existing end users 
and edge providers.173 This does not mean that such materials have 
to be in hard copy or require training of sales employees to be fa-
miliar with all of the terms and conditions.174 Broadband providers 
may comply with this requirement by directing new customers to 
view disclosures on the web, either orally or in writing, and by 
keeping the disclosures regularly updated.175 Nevertheless, brick 
and mortar outlets are encouraged to provide equipment to view 
such disclosures to customers.176 
2. Service Descriptions 
With regard to service descriptions, broadband providers must 
disclose accurate information on network performance for each 
type of service offered.177 For fixed broadband, the OGC suggests 
that a large part of this requirement may be accomplished by dis-
closing the results of the broadband performance measurement 
project (“BPMP”) that records key performance metrics, includ-
ing baseline connection speed as well as latency.178 Although in its 
infancy stages, the BPMP will likely play a major role in attaining 
an accurate measurement of network performance characteristics, 
as it covers roughly eighty-six percent of all fixed connections.179 
For fixed broadband providers participating in the BPMP, disclos-
ing results from the project will be enough to satisfy the require-
ment.180 For instance, providers may elect to report mean upload 
and download speeds during the busy periods of 7:00–11:00 P.M. 
Smaller providers not participating in the BPMP may follow the 
project’s methodology and report results or disclose accurate per-
formance information from internal testing or consumer speed test 
data.181 
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In terms of reporting mobile network performance measures, 
the OGC describes how the FCC will provide further guidance 
once it has an opportunity to review how to best capture and meas-
ure data.182 Subsequent to the OGC guidelines, the FCC has re-
cently released an app that consumers may download onto their 
broadband mobile device to measure speed and latency.183 Until 
that is formally recommended as a measurement and disclosure 
tool, however, mobile broadband providers that attain reliable in-
formation may disclose these results, whether captured by them-
selves or a third party.184 Disclosure in the mobile context may 
mean upload and download speeds or round-trip latency.185 Smaller 
providers without these performance measures may report a typi-
cal speed range (“TSR”) for each service tier offered accompanied 
by a statement that these are the best available approximations.186 
To help ensure accuracy, both mobile and fixed broadband pro-
viders are encouraged to disclose the source and methodology be-
hind their network performance metrics.187 In addition, broadband 
providers are requested to re-evaluate network performance when 
they have knowledge or have reason to believe there is a material 
difference between disclosed and actual network performance.188 
3. Tailoring of Required Disclosures 
The OGC suggests the transparency provisions of the current 
Open Internet Rules in effect may be met through a single disclo-
sure.189 This disclosure may be used to help accurately inform not 
only consumers but content, application, service, and device pro-
viders, including so-called edge providers.190 Mobile providers are 
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also obligated to provide disclosure of their certification and ap-
proval procedures for devices and applications.191 
4. Security Measures 
The OGC also suggests that providers may utilize their discre-
tion in deciding whether to disclose particular security measures to 
consumers.192 Nevertheless, effective disclosures should aim to 
provide information addressing end-user or network security prac-
tices. Broadband providers must be mindful that consumers may 
need to understand security practices to make informed choices for 
their Internet use. Likewise, content, application, service, and de-
vice providers may also require knowledge of security practices to 
aid in their development. The OGC reminds broadband providers 
that security measures may in effect impact the end user’s ability to 
“access the content, applications, services, and devices of his or 
her choice.”193 
5. Extent of Required Disclosures 
Perhaps most importantly, the FCC suggested that the extent 
of the transparency rules may be met by including some or all of the 
following: 
 Network practices (including congestion 
management, application-specific behavior, 
device attachment rules and security measures); 
 Performance characteristics, including a general 
description of system performance (speed, 
latency) and effects of specialized services on 
available capacity; and 
 Commercial terms, including pricing, privacy 
policies, and redress options.194 
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The above areas come directly from Paragraphs 56 and 98 of 
the Open Internet order.195 The OGC clarifies that disclosure of 
information contained in these paragraphs will suffice for compli-
ance with the transparency rule.196 The Commission clearly states 
that all of the items detailing the extent of the required disclosures 
are not exhaustive and providers may meet the disclosure require-
ment in other ways.197 In providing additional flexibility, the FCC 
does not expect that providers will disclose all of the suggested 
items.198 Likewise, the list in and of itself does not constitute a so-
called safe harbor for fulfilling the transparency rules. Upon further 
examination, each of the above provisions contains several ele-
ments as highlighted below. 
a) Network Practices 
The area of network practices centers on how broadband pro-
viders manage their network in ways that may directly impact In-
ternet users.199 As a result, the FCC suggests broadband providers 
disclose congestion management, application-specific behavior, 
device-attachment rules, and security as summarized below: 
 Congestion Management: Description of 
congestion management practices; types of 
traffic; purposes; effects of practices on end-
user experience; criteria used in practices 
(including triggers and frequency of 
congestion); usage limits and consequences of 
exceeding them; and engineering standards.200 
 Application-Specific Behavior: Whether and 
why provider blocks or rate-controls specific 
protocols or protocol ports; modifies protocol 
fields in ways not proscribed by protocols; or 
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inhibits or favors certain applications or classes 
of applications.201 
 Device Attachment Rules: Any restrictions on 
types of devices and approval procedures for 
devices to connect to network.202 
 Security: Practices used to ensure end-user 
security or security of network, including types 
of triggering conditions for mechanisms to be 
invoked.203 
b) Performance Characteristics 
To help end users ascertain the quality of the network, the 
FCC suggests204 broadband providers may detail the following per-
formance characteristics that elaborate on broadband Internet ac-
cess service and any specialized services that may be offered: 
 Service Description: General description of 
service, including technology, expected and 
actual access speed and latency; suitability of 
service for real-time applications.205 
 Impact of Specialized Services: What, if any, are 
offered to end users, and whether and how any 
specialized services may affect last-mile capacity 
available for and the performance of broadband 
Internet access service.206 
c) Commercial Terms 
To set a standard in many terms of use agreements, the FCC 
suggests broadband providers be forthcoming about the commer-
cial terms to help consumers make informed decisions concerning 
broadband Internet access service, including the following: 
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 Pricing: Monthly prices; usage-based fees; fees 
for early termination; fees for additional network 
services.207 
 Privacy Policies: Whether network management 
practices entail inspection of network traffic; 
whether traffic information is stored, provided 
to third parties, or used by the carrier for non-
network management purposes.208 
 Redress Options: Practices for resolving end-
user and edge provider complaints and 
questions.209 
d) Mobile 
The FCC suggests that all of the above transparency provisions 
regarding network practices, performance characteristics, and 
commercial terms also apply to mobile Internet access providers.210 
Mobile providers should also consider their current disclosure ob-
ligations if they are a licensee of the upper 700 MHz block spec-
trum allocation.211 In addition, the FCC suggests mobile providers 
disclose the process for third-party device and application certifica-
tion,212 as well as information regarding denials to access the net-
work or failures to approve particular devices or applications.213 
6. Enforcement 
The Commission may exercise enforcement if broadband pro-
viders fail to comply with the transparency rules through adjudica-
tion on a case-by-case basis, including the issuance of monetary 
penalties.214 Parties who are affected by transparency rule viola-
tions, including end users and edge providers, are encouraged to 
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file informal complaints on the Commission’s website free of filing 
fees under Section 1.41 of FCC rules.215 The Enforcement Bureau 
will monitor informal complaints to locate common themes and 
potentially issue investigations or enforcement actions.216 In addi-
tion, any person may also file a formal complaint that specifies how 
the rules have been violated and contains supporting facts “suffi-
cient to establish a prima facie case.”217 One example of a formal 
open Internet complaint being filed comes from the non-profit Pub-
lic Knowledge, which claims that wireless broadband Internet ac-
cess providers AT&T, Sprint, T-Mobile, and Verizon have failed 
to adequately disclose network practices concerning throttling.218 
Although providers are allowed much discretion on what may 
be included to comply, whatever is disclosed should be accurate. 
As stated in a 2014 enforcement advisory, the FCC believes that 
“accuracy is the bedrock of the Transparency Rule”219 to allow 
consumers to be informed about the purchase of their broadband 
Internet access service and give edge providers the necessary in-
formation to further innovate and compete. Accuracy must take 
place “wherever statements regarding network management prac-
tices, performance, and commercial terms appear—in mailings, the 
sides of buses, on website banner ads, or in retail stores.”220 If a 
provider makes a false or misleading claim of its service perfor-
mance, it would “not defend itself against a Transparency Rule 
violation by pointing to an ‘accurate’ official disclosure in some 
other public place.”221 
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III. COMPLIANCE WITH TRANSPARENCY &  
OPEN INTERNET RULES 
To aid in describing how the FCC’s transparency provisions 
apply to broadband providers, this Part reviews the various compo-
nents of Verizon’s terms-of-service agreements for both fixed and 
mobile broadband. The legal analysis presented below mirrors the 
various categories and descriptors the FCC has suggested in the 
Open Internet Rules as discussed above in Part II. Because they 
require different facilities and transactions, the review of Verizon’s 
terms of service as a fixed and wireless broadband Internet access 
provider are handled separately below. 
A. Verizon’s Fixed Broadband Disclosure 
1. Network Practices 
Verizon’s Network Management Guide, available on its web-
site, provides information for consumers regarding the company’s 
wired broadband network practices.222 The Guide is structured ac-
cording to the Open Internet Rules’ criteria and covers congestion 
management, application-specific behavior, device-attachment 
rules, security, and the effect of specialized services.223 
For congestion management, Verizon notes that it “does not 
affirmatively manage congestion on the network through mecha-
nisms such as real-time throttling, blocking, or dropping of specific 
end user traffic.”224 Moreover, Verizon does not impose data usage 
limits.225 With regard to application-specific behavior, Verizon 
does not “inhibit or favor certain applications or classes of applica-
tions of traffic on [its] Internet access service,”226 except when per-
forming security-related functions such as blocking non-Verizon 
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domain email from being sent from Port 25227 and scanning Verizon 
email messages for spam.228 
Verizon’s device-attachment rules permit users to “attach any 
lawful device to the network as long as it does not harm the net-
work or the provision of Internet access service”229 and provide 
information regarding fee-based technical support to help users 
install third-party devices.230 The security section identifies as trig-
gers for account suspension any violations of its acceptable use pol-
icy or terms of service in addition to any activity that “threatens to 
undermine the integrity or normal operation of our networks or 
services, or the security of our networks or our customers.”231 
2. Performance Characteristics 
In addition to network practices, the Guide also provides some 
performance characteristic information and links to others.232 Veri-
zon provides a general overview of its broadband technology, in-
forming users that factors such as telephone line wiring might af-
fect performance.233 In its discussion of specialized services, the 
Guide warns that Verizon FiOS network speeds “may be reduced 
temporarily during times of significant utilization of FiOS TV vid-
eo on demand service in a particular area or due to other unusual 
events such as a network outage or failure”234 or if a user is watch-
ing multiple FiOS TV streams simultaneously.235 Verizon also in-
cludes a link to speed test results from the FCC’s BPMP report for 
its FiOS236 and DSL237 services. 
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3. Commercial Terms 
Verizon’s website offers wired and wireless Internet pricing in-
formation as called for by the Open Internet Rules.238 Both wired 
and wireless services are subject to Verizon’s privacy policy, which 
includes information regarding the company’s extensive data col-
lection and aggregated data sharing schemes.239 
B. Verizon’s Mobile Broadband Disclosure 
Verizon addresses its network practices, performance charac-
teristics, and commercial terms for wireless broadband services on 
its website in a Q&A scheme that deviates from its aforementioned 
wired broadband policies.240 
1. Network Practices 
Unlike its fixed broadband terms of service that address net-
work practices, Verizon does not follow the FCC’s suggested for-
mat to include application-specific behavior, device-attachment 
rules, and security.241 In addressing congestion management, Veri-
zon warns that for wireless customers who fall “within the top 5% 
of Verizon Wireless data users,”242 the company “may reduce the 
customer’s data throughput speeds when the customer is connect-
ed to a cell site experiencing high demand for the remainder of the 
customer’s then current and immediately following billing cy-
cle.”243 The company also engages in content-neutral network op-
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timization to compress and deliver data efficiently to customers’ 
mobile devices.244 
While Verizon does not discriminate against lawful Internet 
traffic, it does block “malicious or other adverse, network-
impacting traffic”245 and specific IP addresses known to be respon-
sible for spam or cyber threats based on Verizon’s and third-party 
analysis.246 
2. Performance Characteristics 
Verizon explains its performance by detailing the bandwidth 
speed range within which each of its wireless networks operates 
and notes potential limiting factors.247 Verizon also provides infor-
mation about its coverage and testing methodology,248 but does not 
include any mention of the FCC’s suggested inclusion of special-
ized services. 
3. Commercial Terms 
Verizon offers the same type of information regarding its wire-
less pricing as it does for its wired customers.249 
4. Additional Mobile Information 
Verizon only permits its customers to use Verizon-certified de-
vices on its network, although the company is agnostic as to where 
the device is purchased.250 As suggested in the Open Internet 
Rules, Verizon’s website showcases the means by which third-
party devices and applications can be certified for Verizon’s net-
works.251 The “Open Development Device Certification Process” 
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manual describes the standards and processes required for third-
party device certification,252 and the “4G LTE ‘Open Access’ 
Application Guidelines” provide information on application re-
quirements.253 However, Verizon’s website does not provide spe-
cific information regarding its denial of network access to particular 
devices or services. 
C. Verizon’s Compliance with Transparency Rules 
With the exception of some missing information for mobile, 
Verizon is readily disclosing its network practices, performance 
characteristics, and commercial terms that have been suggested by 
the FCC, and therefore appears to be complying with the transpar-
ency provisions of the Open Internet Rules.254 It should also be 
noted that Verizon is attempting to use a single disclosure to meet 
the various needs of end users, edge providers, and the larger In-
ternet community to comply with the existing rules.255 In a similar 
vein, outside of the speed and latency measures, there is no current 
measuring stick other than informal and formal complaints to verify 
the accuracy of the disclosed information. 
 Although not germane to Verizon specifically, the FCC recent-
ly raised a number of complaints regarding end-user transparency 
in its recent Open Internet NPRM.256 This list includes questions 
about whether the information supplied by broadband providers is 
in fact accurate, claims that consumers believe their speed falls 
short of advertised speeds, claims that consumers were charged in 
excess of advertised rates including fees and charges beyond basic 
rates, slow or congested service complaints, not understanding ex-
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cessive use and termination policies, and confusion on how data 
caps are calculated.257  
IV. DISCUSSION & RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
TRANSPARENCY AS NETWORK NEUTRALITY 2.0 
Thus far, the only successful, legally standing policy for net-
work neutrality in the U.S. resides in the transparency rules. Re-
gardless of whether the 2015 Open Internet Order’s reclassification 
of broadband Internet access service and prohibitions against block-
ing, paid prioritization and throttling survive judicial review,258 the 
disclosure provisions of the Open Internet Rules are likely to sus-
tain and play a vital role moving forward in how we govern and stay 
informed with respect to the first and last mile of broadband con-
nectivity. The network neutrality transparency rules provide a po-
tential safeguard to the fact that most consumers do not have a 
great array of choices when it comes to their broadband ISP, espe-
cially in the fixed context. To the extent the FCC forces the hand 
of broadband providers to disclose how they manage their network, 
the transparency rules should be applauded as a regulatory strategy 
that aims to help inform consumers, edge providers, and the broad-
er Internet community. 
But as this Article demonstrates, the transparency rules do not 
solve everything; rather, they simply provide us with what other-
wise may not have been disclosed information in standard, pre-
Open Internet Rules terms of use or service agreements. Even the 
mere suggestions of what to include in the agreements leave the 
broadband providers with a great deal of latitude because the 
                                                                                                                            
257 Id. 
258 Shortly after the FCC released the text of its order, USTelecom filed a lawsuit 
challenging the new rules and the Title II classification even before the official rules were 
published in the Federal Register. See Brian Fung, Here are the First Lawsuits to Challenge 
the FCC’s Net Neutrality Rules, WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 2015, http://www.washington
post.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2015/03/23/the-first-of-the-net-neutrality-lawsuits-has-
now-been-filed/. A number of lawsuits are expected and may result in putting pressure on 
Congress to address network neutrality through legislation. See Siobhan Hughes, FCC’s 
Net Neutrality Rules Expected to Unleash Court Challenges, WALL ST. J., Feb. 25, 2015, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/fccs-net-neutrality-rules-expected-to-unleash-court-
challenges-1424919940. 
680 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.[Vol. XXV:639 
 
FCC’s list is admittedly not exhaustive, nor must everything on the 
list be disclosed. 
Terms of use agreements and their disclosure play an increas-
ingly important role for social media sites, broadband providers, 
and mobile applications, as they typically confer a bundle of rights 
and legal provisions to providers and users. These arrangements 
generally take the form of non-negotiated contracts of adhesion as 
so-called “click-wrap” agreements, which define providers’ rela-
tionships with their users.259 In practice, these terms of use agree-
ments leave no room for negotiation and are more or less a take-it-
or-leave-it offering to the consumer by the broadband Internet ac-
cess provider. Depending on locality and whether it is fixed or mo-
bile connectivity, a consumer may have to merely accept these pro-
visions, including network management practices that are disclosed 
under the Open Internet Rules because there is simply no choice 
among broadband providers in a specific geographic area. 
The dependency on terms of service as a form of primary dis-
closure to comply with the transparency rules relies on an im-
portant assumption and critique of so-called click-wrap agree-
ments. Most individuals rarely read the varied terms of service that 
they consent to prior to obtaining service. Furthermore, often indi-
viduals lack the literacy in understanding all of the legal and tech-
nical jargon of conditions that specify rights and liability. Lastly, 
terms of use are non-negotiable from the standpoint of the provider 
and do not provide much in the way of participation from consum-
ers other than to refuse consent or litigate the provider for breach 
of contract. 
To help alleviate some of these concerns, the transparency 
rules do provide a participatory mechanism to the FCC through 
the informal complaint process. But more efforts should be done to 
help improve outreach and consumer education in this area 
through various guides with suggested topics such as understand-
ing terms of use, navigating network management practices and 
what it means for you, and factors in choosing a fixed or wireless 
broadband Internet access provider. In addition, to make some of 
the more fundamental consumer concerns more prominent, the 
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FCC should consider adopting many of the recommendations of 
the Open Internet Label Study Transparency Working Group,260 
suggesting a simplified practice be made available to consumers as 
an option to full disclosure or terms of use transparency. A broad-
band provider “nutrition label” as suggested by the New America 
Foundation would mostly emphasize speed, price and usage re-
strictions.261 Likewise, as several scholars have commented,262 the 
Commission should be mindful of providing too much technical 
language to consumers and instead, as suggested by the Internet 
NPRM, make sure to provide tailored disclosures to edge and over-
the-top providers that provide the necessary technical elements to 
allow further innovation of services.263 
There are also problems associated with the Commission’s ef-
forts in transparency concerning accuracy and self-disclosure. Out-
side of speed and latency that is mostly measured by the BPMP for 
fixed and its new mobile apps for wireless, the FCC relies upon 
broadband providers’ self-reporting of accurate information to 
comply with the disclosure rules. There is no accountability unless 
there are either informal or formal complaints filed.264 Nor is it 
clear what the definition of “accurate” specifically entails and 
whether it may truly extend, as the FCC’s advisory suggested, le-
gally to a false (or not completely accurate) claim made in an adver-
tisement about a broadband feature.265 Transparency works best 
when disclosure of information provided to the public is accurate as 
well as easily understood, monitored, and enforced.266 
Lastly, the transparency rules do foster the sharing of infor-
mation that may lead to greater advanced telecommunications ca-
pability and promote local competition in Section 706, especially if 
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disclosure addresses end users, edge providers, and the larger In-
ternet community. The clear disclosure of network management 
practices and quality of service measures in broadband Internet ac-
cess providers’ terms of use agreements provides important infor-
mation to consumers to make informed choices about their selec-
tion of their high-speed provider and expectations in terms of what 
they may experience as a subscriber. Furthermore, disclosure also 
allows edge providers to better understand how their particular da-
ta traffic may be managed and prioritized by broadband providers 
and whether they need to adapt their own protocols to provide a 
more seamless experience for their users. This disclosure to edge 
providers will further foster greater innovation and ensure availa-
bility of a competitive array of advanced telecommunications capa-
bility services that are available to consumers vis-à-vis their local 
broadband Internet access provider. 
While disclosure and transparency provisions should be essen-
tial components of the FCC’s approach to network neutrality going 
forward, questions nevertheless remain about the confounding na-
ture of terms of use and service agreements throughout various as-
pects of the Internet. Although it may not fall under the direct aus-
pices of Section 706, greater consideration of how privacy, securi-
ty, and copyright provisions exist within the broadband providers’ 
terms of use agreements is warranted, as many end users rely on 
this connection as their vital link to the rest of the Internet ecosys-
tem. This is especially the case if the prohibitions against blocking, 
paid prioritization and throttling eventually are not mandated. Re-
gardless, transparency is important in an environment in which 
terms of use and service agreements continue to take on additional 
importance because of the ever-increasing growth in user-
generated content, smartphone applications, and social media en-
gagement and the corresponding legal and ethical concerns regard-
ing personal privacy, anonymity, data use, and copyright. Ultimate-
ly, many Americans are concerned about Internet blocking and dis-
crimination even if they do not agree on how to regulate it.267 This 
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will make transparency and access to relevant information an in-
creasingly important factor to further the development of advanced 
telecommunications capability in the years to come, including the 
use of broadband services and applications. 
